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CLEAN DRINKING WATER: A STREAM OF SUCCESS  




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Forty-five years ago, Congress passed the first version of the Safe Drinking 
Water Act1 (SDWA or Act). In passing the Act, Congress provided a set of 
comprehensive rules to govern the quality of the drinking water being provided by 
public water systems (PWSs) across the nation. As originally enacted, the SDWA 
defined a “public water system” as a system that provided drinking water to at least 
twenty-five people or fifteen service connections for a minimum of sixty days per 
year.2 Previous regulations had been limited to water supplied to and on interstate 
carriers, vastly restricting the scope of regulated waters.3  
In order to achieve safe drinking water, the principle mechanism adopted was 
defining enforceable standards for acceptable water quality.4 The U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was designated the authority to set those 
standards, called maximum contaminant levels (MCLs).5 The primary federal 
responsibility was to establish the MCLs and other guidelines to serve as baseline 
measures for both state governments and the water suppliers.6 
The Act continues to regulate numerous systems today, helping to ensure that 
communities have clean drinking water. According to a Congressional Research 
Report released in March 2017, the SDWA applies to about 152,700 water systems.7 
                                                        
* © 2019 Kayla Weiser-Burton. Executive Environmental Editor, Utah Law Review, 
J.D. Candidate May 2019, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. I would like to 
thank the Utah Law Review staff for their insightful feedback and assistance. I would also 
like to thank my family and friends, especially my husband, for their perpetual 
encouragement. 
1 Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–j-9 (Suppl. IV 1974) (current version at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–j-27 (2018)). 
2 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 25 YEARS OF THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT: HISTORY 
AND TRENDS 3 (1999) [hereinafter SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS], https://nepis.epa.gov 
[https://perma.cc/2GQD-392A] (search “866R99007”).  
3 See William E. Cox, Evolution of the Safe Drinking Water Act: A Search for Effective 
Quality Assurance Strategies and Workable Concepts of Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 69, 70 (1997). 
4 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (Supp. IV 1974). For purposes of the SDWA, the EPA was defined 
as the “Administrator” in 42 U.S.C. § 300f(7) (Supp. IV 1974). 
5 Id. § 300g-1(b). 
6 See Cox, supra note 3, at 70. 
7 MARY TIEMANN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT 
(SDWA): A SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND ITS MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 3 (2017), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31243.pdf [https://perma.cc/FB7Z-BMAM] [hereinafter 
SDWA SUMMARY]. 
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Approximately 51,000 of these are community water systems that benefit the same 
residences all year.8 These PWSs provide water to close to 300 million people, and 
all federal regulations are applicable.9 Over 18,000 PWSs are non-transient, non-
community water systems, generally serving the same people for more than six 
months out of the year, but not year-round.10 The majority of federal regulations 
apply to these water systems.11 Lastly, nearly 83,200 other PWSs are transient, non-
community water systems, providing their own water to transitory customers, such 
as rest stops, gas stations, and campgrounds.12 The only applicable regulations are 
for those pollutants that pose immediate health risks.13 
While the Act has come a long way since its inception, through regulating more 
contaminants and providing additional mechanisms to ensure proper water quality, 
it is still flawed. This Note will first examine the history of the SDWA, from the first 
enactment in 1974 to the current version of the statute, highlighting the major 
amendments of 1986, 1996, and 2016. Part III will examine some of the key 
successes that have come from the Act and its amendments. Part IV will examine 
two instances where the Act still falls short, focusing on the water crisis in Flint, 
Michigan and the exemption for oil and gas well operations. Finally, this Note will 
offer some suggestions on how to address the shortcomings—specifically, the Act 
should (i) mandate updates for failing infrastructure and require more rigorous 
monitoring to ensure compliance; (ii) be applied again to regulate the oil and gas 
industry; and (iii) regulate more hazardous chemicals.  
 
II.  HISTORY 
 
A.  Municipal Water Before the SDWA 
 
Water has always been recognized as a fundamental requirement for human 
life. Ancient civilizations were either built near water resources,14 or were developed 
in some way to harness water from a more distant source. While populations 
accepted the importance of water quantity to sustain life, water quality was not 
                                                        
8 Id. 
9 See id. (“These water systems provide water to more than 299 million people. All 
federal regulations apply to these systems.”). 
10 See id. (noting that 18,718 public water systems are non-transient non-community 
water systems, such as schools or factories).  
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
13 Id. at n.3 (“The EPA’s longstanding policy is to exclude transient systems from 
drinking water regulations except for those contaminants, such as nitrate, that the EPA 
believes have the potential to cause immediate adverse human health effects resulting from 
short-term exposure.”) (citing National Primary Drinking Water Regulation on Lead and 
Copper, 65 Fed. Reg. 1950 (Jan. 12, 2000)). 
14 SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 1. 
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always so readily understood.15 As populations continued to grow and communities 
became denser, problems with sanitation and pollution arose.16  
It was not until the 19th century that scientists began to comprehend the link 
between disease and contaminated water.17 In the 1850s, Dr. John Snow proved his 
theory that transmission of disease could occur by drinking contaminated water.18 A 
couple of decades later, French chemist and microbiologist Louis Pasteur showed 
that food spoiled due to contamination by microbes in the air.19 He went on to 
develop the “germ theory” of disease,20 arguing that these microbes could transmit 
disease through the water supply.21 This theory helped to prove the relationship 
between contaminated water and localized disease outbreaks.22 
In the early 20th century, scientists’ and engineers’ primary focus concerning 
water quality was the removal of pathogens from the public water supply.23 The 
federal government began regulating water quality in 1914, when the U.S. Public 
Health Service (PHS) set standards for bacteria content in water systems providing 
drinking water to interstate carriers.24 While it was not federally mandated, each of 
the states individually adopted the same standards to use as guidelines for local 
PWSs.25 
Congress addressed water pollution across the nation in 1948 by passing the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.26 The original statute “authorized the Surgeon 
General of the Public Health Service, in cooperation with other Federal, state and 
local entities, to prepare comprehensive programs for eliminating or reducing the 
pollution of interstate waters and tributaries and improving the sanitary condition of 
surface and underground waters.”27 It also gave authorization to the Federal Works 
                                                        
15 Id. 
16 See id. at 2 (discussing the “germ theory” of disease, which explained how 
microorganisms could transit diseases through mediums such as water); see also Linda 
Poppenheimer, Clean Water Laws — Prior to Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, GREEN 
GROUNDSWELL BLOG (June 24, 2013), http://greengroundswell.com/clean-water-laws-prior-
to-safe-drinking-water-act-of-1974/2013/06/24/ [https://perma.cc/NPK5-PT7F] (discussing 
the various connections made between contaminated water and disease in the 19th century).  
17 Poppenheimer, supra note 16. 
18 Dr. John Snow, JOHN SNOW INC., http://www.jsi.com/JSIInternet/About/snow.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/CC4Z-E26J]. 
19 Louis Pasteur: The Man Who Led the Fight Against Germs, BBC, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/timelines/z9kj2hv [https://perma.cc/J7DD-CY8V]. 
20 Id. 
21 See SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 2. 
22 Id. 
23 See id. 
24 Id. 
25 See id. 
26 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., DIGEST OF FEDERAL RESOURCE LAWS OF INTEREST 
TO THE U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE: FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT 
(CLEAN WATER ACT), https://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/fwatrpo.html [https://perma.cc 
/6CSA-3LN8]. 
27 Id. 
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Administrator to assist municipalities, states, and interstate agencies to construct 
treatment plants to treat sewage before discharging it into interstate waters and 
tributaries.28 
The statute was amended numerous times, most notably in 1972, transforming 
the law into the Clean Water Act (CWA).29 These amendments highlight the 
objectives of Congress to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”30 One of the most distinguished updates 
included the establishment of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES),31 regulating the discharge of pollutants through point sources into a 
“water of the United States” through a permit system.32 These permits establish 
discharge limits, monitoring requirements, and further provisions to protect water 
quality and public health.33 Additionally, the 1972 amendments gave the EPA the 
authority to implement pollution control programs, provided funding to construct 
sewage treatment plants, and preserved the requirements to establish water quality 
standards for surface waters.34 
While general water quality regulations increased, there was a growing 
apprehension regarding the management of drinking water supplies. The 
inadequacies of drinking water regulations came to light in a 1970 PHS study 
concerning PWSs.35 The study surveyed 969 PWSs located in nine areas across the 
United States, including both large and small systems.36 It found that “[36%] of . . . 
individual tap water samples contained one or more bacteriological or chemical 
constituents exceeding the limits in the Public Health Service Drinking Water 
Standards.”37 Additionally, 56% of the service facilities exhibited physical 
deficiencies including inadequate protection of groundwater sources and faulty 
disinfection techniques.38  
These shortcomings, along with the rising concern of pesticides and other 
industrial chemicals reaching drinking water supplies, prompted Congress to pass 
the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974. 
                                                        
28 Id. 
29 See History of the Clean Water Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/laws-
regulations/history-clean-water-act [https://perma.cc/C4DH-SHNV]; see also U.S. FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERVICE, supra note 26. 
30 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (Supp. II 1972). 
31 See id. § 1342. 
32 See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-permit-basics [https://perma.cc/BDF9-XZNW]. 
33 See id. 
34 See History of the Clean Water Act, supra note 29. 
35 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COMMUNITY WATER SUPPLY STUDY: SIGNIFICANCE 
OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 1 (1999), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyNET.EXE?ZyActionL=Regis 
ter&User=anonymous&Password=anonymous&Client=EPA&Init=1 [https://perma.cc/9A 
DV-ZCA3] [hereinafter COMMUNITY WATER SUPPLY STUDY]. 
36 Id. at 5. 
37 Id. at 10. 
38 Id. 
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B.  The Original SDWA 
 
The primary purpose of passing the SDWA was to study contaminants in 
drinking water sources and design maximum level goals for each contaminant in 
order to protect consumers.39 The determination of fixed limits for each contaminant 
mirrored prior programs, but the sweeping difference was that the limits now applied 
to all PWSs above a certain size.40 The Act gave the Administrator of the EPA 
(Administrator) the power of oversight and enforcement of the applicable 
standards.41 
The new standards were divided into two categories, the first of which were the 
national primary drinking water regulations (NPDWRs),42 covering substances that 
may have an adverse effect on human health. The second category contains national 
secondary drinking water regulations (NSDWRs),43 which include substances that 
may adversely affect human welfare, including the odor or appearance of the water. 
NSDWRs are not enforceable under federal law.44 
For each of the NPDWRs, the EPA is required to establish a health goal, defined 
as “the level of contaminant in drinking water below which there is no known or 
expected risk to health.”45 This standard is the “recommended maximum 
contaminant level” (RMCL).46 While the RMCL standard itself is not legally 
enforceable, it guides the EPA in establishing the “maximum contaminant level” 
(MCL).47 MCLs are legally enforceable and are as close to the RMCL as possible, 
taking into consideration both cost and technological feasibility.48 
The 1974 SDWA required the EPA to regulate drinking water in two steps, the 
first of which was to create interim NPDWRs, largely based on the twenty-eight 
PHS standards.49 In addition to establishing MCLs, there were requirements for the 
monitoring and analysis of regulated contaminants, record keeping, and a provision 
to notify the public if a water system fails to meet the federal standards.50 The second 
step was to revise these standards after the National Academy of Sciences reviewed 
them in light of the health risks to consumers.51 The first eighteen interim standards 
                                                        
39 See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b) (Supp. IV 1974); SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 
2, at 2. 
40 See Cox, supra note 3, at 77. 
41 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2 (Supp. IV 1974). 
42 Id. § 300f (1). 
43 Id. § 300f (2).  
44 Id. 
45 SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 4. 
46 Cox, supra note 3, at 78. 
47 Id. 
48 See id.; see also SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 4. 
49 SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 6. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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of 1975 included “six synthetic organic chemicals, ten inorganic chemicals, 
turbidity, and total coliform bacteria.”52 
The SDWA included additional provisions to ensure the safety of drinking 
water. One example is the underground injection control (UIC) program,53 
implemented as a response to the lack of federal regulation of groundwater 
pollution.54 However, this applied only to the operation of injection wells, and 
thereby excluded many potential sources of groundwater contamination.55 A second 
example is the sole-source aquifer protection program.56 Aquifers that had received 
a special designation due to their important relationship to public health were 
provided protection to ensure that federally-funded activities caused them no harm.57 
While recognizing that not all provisions were necessarily feasible, the Act 
provided for variances58 and exemptions.59 Variances provide exceptions for MCLs 
where raw water quality prevents a PWS from complying with the standard, despite 
the use of the best available technology.60 A state with primary enforcement 
responsibility for PWSs may also grant exceptions to NPDWR provisions requiring 
the use of a specific treatment, if that treatment is unnecessary to protect public 
health.61 Exemptions provide exceptions to compliance with MCLs or the treatment 
requirements if a PWS is unable to comply due to “compelling factors,” including 
economic burdens.62 If an exemption is granted, control measures and a compliance 
schedule for meeting the NPDWR are required.63 However, neither variances nor 
exemptions may be granted if there is an unreasonable risk to human health.64 
In administering the Act, the EPA was given the authority to delegate the 
primary responsibility for enforcement, or “primacy,” to states, territories, or tribes, 
so long as they met specific requirements.65 The EPA provided grants to the states 
and assisted in administering their programs.66 “With EPA’s oversight, states with 
primacy adopt, implement, and enforce the standards established by the federal 
drinking water program to ensure that the public water systems in their jurisdictions 
provide consumers with safe water.”67 States require PWSs to collect water samples 
                                                        
52 Id. 
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 300h-3 (Supp. IV 1974). 
54 See Cox, supra note 3, at 79. 
55 See id. 
56 See 42 U.S.C. § 300h-3(e) (Supp. IV 1974). 
57 Id. § 300h-(3)(a)(1). 
58 Id. § 300g-4; see also id. § 300g-2 (a)(4). 
59 Id. § 300g-5. 
60 Id. § 300g-4(a)(1)(A). 
61 Id. § 300g-4(a)(1)(B). 
62 Id. § 300g-5(a)(1). 
63 Id. § 300g-5(b). 
64 Id. § 300g-5(a)(3). 
65 See SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 4 (discussing the roles of states that 
have primacy; at the time this report was published, all states but Wyoming had assumed 
primacy and received grants from the EPA). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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and have them tested in state-approved laboratories.68 After receiving the results, 
states must then determine whether the PWS is in compliance or violation of the 
federally mandated standards.69 If it is in violation, the public must be notified.70 
In passing the SDWA, there was an assumption that new regulations would be 
easily adopted. But in actuality, the next twelve years showed only slow progress, 
finally spurring Congress to adopt the 1986 amendments.  
 
C.  Amendments of 1986 
 
Between 1975 and 1985, the EPA had only developed regulations for twenty-
three additional contaminants.71 Aside from wanting to speed up that pace, Congress 
also wished to address deficiencies in the implementation of established programs.72 
One such deficiency was the increased concern regarding synthetic chemicals from 
agriculture and manufacturing, both of which were being detected in water sources 
at alarming rates.73 
First, the 1986 amendments changed some of the terminology from the original 
Act. The approach of having both “interim” and “revised” standards was abandoned 
and all existing interim NPDWRs were now designated simply as NPDWRs.74 
Additionally, RMCLs were now referred to as MCLGs or “maximum contaminant 
level goals.”75 
Second, the 1986 amendments required the EPA to set MCLGs and MCLs for 
eighty-three specified contaminants.76 Within twelve months, NPDWRs were 
required for at least nine of those listed.77 At least forty additional contaminants were 
required to have NPDWRs within twenty-four months and the rest had a deadline of 
thirty-six months.78 The legislation also required the EPA to establish further 
regulations beyond the listed eighty-three contaminants within set timeframes, to 
establish additional programs to protect groundwater, and to specify the “best 
available technology” for treating each contaminant with a designated MCL.79 
                                                        
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 4–5. There are three main types of violations: (1) MCL violation, when the 
level of a contaminant in treated water exceeds the EPA or state’s legal limit, (2) treatment 
technique violation, when a PWS fails to treat drinking water in the manner designated by 
the EPA, and (3) monitoring and reporting violation, when a system fails to test its waters, 
or if it fails to report test results in a timely manner. Id.  
70 Id. at 5. 
71 See SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 7. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. Another concern was the lack of sufficient control over disease-causing microbial 
contaminants. Id. 
74 See Cox, supra note 3, at 81. 
75 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(a) (Supp. IV 1986). 
76 See SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 7. 
77 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).  
78 Id. § 300g-1(b)(1)(B), (C).  
79 See SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 7. 
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Finally, one of the most important revisions was the requirement that lead-free 
materials be used to repair or install new PWSs or plumbing systems that provided 
water for human consumption.80 Additionally, PWSs were required to notify people 
potentially affected by lead contamination from the water, either from lead being 
within the water supply or if the water was corrosive enough as to cause the leaching 
of lead from the pipes.81 This spurred the passing of the Lead and Copper Rule 
(LCR) in 1991,82 requiring PWSs to treat water to prevent the corrosion of lead 
pipes.83 Under the SDWA, the LCR determines the action level—the point at which 
additional prevention or removal steps are required—for lead of 15 parts per billion 
(ppb), even though there is no safe level of lead.84 Specifically, the LCR states that 
“[if] lead concentrations exceed an action level of 15 [ppb] . . . in more than 10% of 
customer taps sampled, the public water system must undertake a number of 
additional actions to control corrosion.”85 
 
D.  Amendments of 1996 
 
The 1996 amendments continued to broaden regulations for drinking water in 
some regards but also slowed the pace for other regulatory procedures. There was a 
general belief that the 1986 amendments had created a “regulatory treadmill” in the 
forced establishment of MCLGs and NPDWRs and there was a large demand to slow 
that process.86 The practice of maintaining a list of unregulated contaminants as 
candidates for regulation and continuing to select some of those candidates remained 
the same, but the pace of publishing regulations substantially decreased.87 
One of the big regulatory overhauls shifted focus to a more in-depth scientific 
study on setting regulations “based on data about the adverse health effects of the 
contaminant, the occurrence of the contaminant in public water systems, and the 
estimated reduction in health risk that would result from regulation.”88 The EPA was 
required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for each proposed regulation, comparing 
the costs charged to water suppliers with the health benefits conferred to the public.89 
                                                        
80 See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-6(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). 
81 See id.  
82 See 40 C.F.R. § 141 (1991); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NO. 570/9-91-400, 
LEAD AND COPPER RULE FACT SHEET (1995). 
83 See id. §141-80(b). 
84 ERIK OLSON & KRISTI PULLEN FEDINICK, NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, WHAT’S IN 
YOUR WATER? FLINT AND BEYOND 3 (2016), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/whats-
in-your-water-flint-beyond-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G7L-LSW6]. 
85 40 C.F.R. § 141.80(c)(1). 
86 See Cox, supra note 3, at 91. 
87 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1996), with 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b) 
(Supp. IV 1986) (showing the similarity of the 1986 amendments with the 1996 
amendments). 
88 See SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 10. 
89 Id. (“Public health protection remains the primary basis for deciding the levels at 
which drinking water standards are set.”). 
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The 1996 amendments also sought to improve public relations by means of 
providing accessible information and supporting public participation.90 Starting in 
1999, all community water systems were required to prepare an annual water quality 
report that included information about the source of the water being provided, levels 
of regulated contaminants found in the water, and the known health effects of 
contaminants detected above the safety limit.91 If a PWS violated a federal drinking 
water standard at any point, it was required to notify its customers of the breach.92 
By 2003, states with primacy were required to conduct assessments of water sources 
in order to identify threats of contamination and how likely it was for a given water 
source to be contaminated.93 The public could assist in these assessments, and the 
results had to be made available to the communities.94 
There was also a push from the federal government to help the states maintain 
compliance. A new federal grant program, titled the Drinking Water State Revolving 
Fund (DWSRF),95 was established to give money to the states who, in turn, would 
loan it to PWSs to update their facilities and ensure standards were being met.96 Each 
state was required to develop a plan for intended use of the grant money and was 
required to seek public input.97 Federal grant contributions were also conditioned by 
provisions that encouraged compliance with recommended non-mandatory 
provisions of the SDWA, including the “development of technical, managerial, and 
financial capacity of public systems.”98 In order to receive the full amount of 
funding, each state had to ensure new systems had adequate capacity to sustain their 
customers and develop procedures for spotting and repairing capacity deficiencies.99 
While the 1996 Amendments reeled back the pace of implementing new 
regulations, many changes were still made to the benefit of consumers. The increase 
of public awareness and involvement was a significant milestone, both simply by 
being equitable in informing consumers, and by helping to promote accountability 
of the persons or companies maintaining the water systems.  
  
                                                        
90 See id. at 11 (detailing several reports, assessments, databases, and programs that the 




93 Id.; see also Cox, supra note 3, at 91. 
94 SDWA HISTORY & TRENDS, supra note 2, at 11. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. (“This federal grant program provides money for states . . . [to] provide loans to 
water systems to upgrade their facilities . . . . A portion of each state’s federal grant money 
can be set aside for several specific purposes, including acquiring land to buffer drinking 
water sources from contamination and funding other local protection activities.”). 
97 Id. 
98 See Cox, supra note 3, at 92; 42 U.S.C. § 300j-12(a)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. III 2016). 
99 See id. § 300j-12(a)(1)(G)(i), § 300g-9(a), § 300g-9(c). 
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E.  Amendments of 2016 
 
In December 2016, Congress passed the Water Infrastructure Improvements 
Act (WIIN Act).100 Congress’ intent was “to provide for improvements to the rivers 
and harbors of the United States [and] to provide for the conservation and 
development of water and related resources.”101 While the WIIN Act was broadly 
applicable, it resulted in numerous revisions to the SDWA.102 
The WIIN Act authorized new grant programs in an effort to help communities, 
particularly those in economic distress, to pursue better quality drinking water while 
maintaining both their economic and environmental vitality.103 Specifically, the 
grant programs do the following: “(1) help public water systems serving small or 
disadvantaged communities meet SDWA requirements; (2) support lead reduction 
projects, including lead service line replacement; and (3) establish a voluntary 
program for testing for lead in drinking water at schools and child care programs.”104 
The WIIN Act also authorized $100 million in DWSRFs for communities105 under 
the Stafford Act.106 
 
III.  ACCOMPLISHMENTS UNDER THE SDWA 
 
The single most important aspect of the SDWA is that it has provided a uniform 
set of regulations for drinking water systems nationally. It is no longer up to the 
individual states to determine what chemicals should be regulated and how, or to 
manage the financing to update and implement new water systems. The Act is 
arguably one of the most important pieces of legislation regarding day-to-day usage 
of a generalized commodity, something typically taken for granted. 
The list of NPDWRs monitored by the EPA today includes a wide variety of 
contaminants.107 Sources of these contaminants vary from erosion of natural 
deposits, to intentional discharge by various industries, to simply being a byproduct 
of drinking water disinfection.108 The sheer number of sources for water pollution is 
proof that there needs to be a uniform system in place to monitor drinking water 
                                                        
100 Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-322, 130 
Stat. 1628 (2016). 
101 Id. 
102 SDWA SUMMARY, supra note 7, at 3. 
103 See Sarah M. Beason et al., A WIIN for Water Infrastructure, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 27, 
2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=15d2beb6-c301-4182-bd8b-07c57 
8dea69c [https://perma.cc/D4DW-9CJY]. 
104 SDWA SUMMARY, supra note 7, at 3. 
105 Beason et al., supra note 103, at 3. 
106 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5123 (Supp. III 2016).  
107 See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/ground-water-and-drinking-water/national-primary-drinking-water-
regulations [https://perma.cc/5Z6E-47XU]. 
108 See id. Additional sources include runoff, decay of cement in water lines and 
corrosion of household pipes. 
2019] CLEAN DRINKING WATER 513 
 
supplies to ensure its overall quality. Without a systematic approach to 
comprehensively address the multitudes of contaminants and their sources, there 
would no doubt be some states left with poor standards.  
Another achievement under the SDWA is the availability of federal funding, 
largely as a result of the 1996 amendments. The DWSRF program is a powerful 
funding tool between the federal government and the states, with Congress in charge 
of appropriating the funds.109 The EPA provides grants to the states and Puerto Rico 
in order to capitalize their loan program, where the states provide an additional 20% 
match in funds.110 Direct grant funding is also provided for the District of Columbia 
and some U.S. territories.111 “The 51 DWSRF programs function like infrastructure 
banks by providing low interest loans to eligible recipients for drinking water 
infrastructure projects.”112 Since inception, the state DWSRFs have provided more 
than $32.5 billion to water systems, building on a federal investment of $19.1 
billion.113 Without this federal assistance, states may not have the funds for the 
necessary infrastructure updates.  
More recently, the WIIN Act was passed to provide additional financial 
assistance to struggling communities. The WIIN Act authorized funding for water 
infrastructure improvements, research, as well as reauthorizing various watershed 
conservation and restoration programs. In response to the Flint crisis, the EPA 
awarded a $100 million grant to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 
to fund infrastructure updates, which was funded by the WIIN Act.114 The funding 
was provided to help enable Flint to accelerate and expand its efforts to upgrade 
infrastructure after their water catastrophe. Combined with the $250 million in state 
funds already allocated to Flint, this additional funding will go a long way in helping 
make the essential upgrades, especially in regard to replacing or treating corroded 
lead pipes. 
While the SDWA has made significant improvements in how drinking water is 
regulated, there are still present-day concerns that need to be addressed in order to 
continue providing clean water. Scientific and technological advances continue to 
discover new sources of contamination, as well as new contaminants in our water 
systems. In light of this information, the SDWA needs to be amended further. 
 
                                                        






113 See id. Assistance was provided through over 13,000 agreements for improving 
drinking water treatment, fixing old pipes, improving source of water supplies, replacing or 
constructing finished water storage tanks, and additional infrastructure projects required to 
protect public health. 
114 News Release, EPA, EPA Awards $100 Million to Michigan for Flint Water 
Infrastructure Upgrades (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-awards-
100-million-michigan-flint-water-infrastructure-upgrades [https://perma.cc/BH9C-8CJS]. 
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IV.  WHERE THE SDWA IS STILL FLAWED 
 
A.  The Water Crisis in Flint 
 
The city of Flint is located along the Flint River, approximately sixty miles 
northwest of Detroit, Michigan.115 Being on the river, Flint was home to a number 
of industries in the 1800s, including fur trading, lumber, and the manufacture of 
carriages.116 Once the automobile industry took off, Flint again found itself an 
industrial hub, with Buick Motor Company founded there in 1903, and General 
Motors in 1908.117 Unfortunately, this industrial vibrancy did not last. In 1960, the 
population of Flint had peaked over 200,000, and by 2014, it had dropped below 
100,000.118 Poverty has since swept through Flint, “with [41.6%] of the population 
living below federal poverty thresholds—2.8 times the national poverty rate.”119  
The first water system of Flint was established in the late 1800s under private 
ownership, and the city later bought it in 1903.120 The Flint River provided an easy 
source for water and was treated at a water plant before dispersal to residents.121 To 
ensure a reliable water supply, Flint agreed to a long-term water contract with the 
Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) in 1967, with water being 
supplied from Lake Huron and treated for corrosion control.122 
The clean water being supplied from DWSD did not last. Flint took a hard hit 
from the 2008 financial crisis, driving Michigan Governor Rick Snyder to declare a 
state of financial emergency in Flint.123 In an effort to save money, Flint planned on 
purchasing their water from a soon-to-be-built pipeline from Karegnondi Water 
Authority, who would still supply the water from Lake Huron.124 In the meantime, 
as a temporary solution, the city began to use water from the Flint River.125 While 
there is still a question as to who exactly authorized this transition, Howard Croft, 
the former director of public works for Flint, asserts that the decision came directly 
                                                        
115 Jim Shelson, Lead in the Water—The Flint Water Crisis, 83 DEF. COUNSEL J. 520, 
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from the Governor’s administration.126 Regardless of who gave the authorization, 
this decision had catastrophic effects.  
According to a verified class action complaint filed in 2016, Flint government 
officials authorized a study of the Flint River in 2011 to determine if it could safely 
be used as a primary source of drinking water.127 The results overwhelmingly 
indicated that the river water was unsafe without anti-corrosive agents to prevent the 
leaching of lead, copper, and other heavy metals from the pipes into the water.128 In 
2014, the city emergency manager at the time, Darnell Earley, ordered Flint to begin 
pulling their water from the Flint River.129 At the time the order was given, Mr. 
Earley had knowledge “that the water was highly corrosive and dangerous to people 
and property when distributed without proper anti-corrosive treatment,” a treatment 
that had an estimated cost of $60 per day.130 
Within days of the switch, water users began to complain that their water was 
foul in appearance, taste, and color.131 Flint citizens expressed their concerns over 
the following eight months.132 Soon after the Flint River became the primary source 
of municipal water, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) 
and Flint officials gained knowledge that the water contained elevated levels of 
Trihalomethanes (TTHM).133 Flint water users finally received a notice of the 
contaminant breach in January 2015.134 Allegedly, Mr. Earley refused demands for 
responsive action, and rejected Detroit’s offer to waive the $4 million reconnection 
fee that would allow for reconnection to the Lake Huron water supply.135  
The problems with the Flint River only continued to multiply. That summer, 
scientists from Virginia Tech tested nearly 300 drinking water samples in Flint.136 
Approximately thirty of the samples indicated lead levels of 25 ppb, substantially 
exceeding the federally-mandated action level of 15 ppb, and overall, the water from 
                                                        
126 Curt Guyette, Exclusive: Gov. Rick Snyder’s Men Originally Rejected Using Flint’s 
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the river was nineteen times more corrosive than the Lake Huron waters.137 
Additionally, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha, a local pediatrician, began studying the lead 
levels in children.138 What she found was startling—the percentage of children in 
Flint suffering from elevated lead blood levels had doubled since the water supply 
had been switched to the Flint River.139 “[S]tudies of lead exposure in children, 
particularly those under the age of 6, indicate an increased risk for damage to 
cognition, behavior and employment prospects, also lower I.Q.s, poor impulse 
control and decreased lifetime earnings.”140 More than 8,000 vulnerable children 
drank the contaminated water.141 
Faced with this astounding evidence that the water was unsafe, Genesee County 
Health Officials issued a public health emergency in October of 2015, and advised 
Flint residents not to drink their tap water.142 Additionally, Governor Snyder ordered 
the Flint water supply be reconnected to Detroit.143 The Governor also appointed an 
independent task force—the Flint Water Advisory Task Force—to conduct a review 
to determine what happened, why it happened, and what was necessary to prevent 
another water disaster.144 The report concluded: 
 
The Flint water crisis is a story of government failure, intransigence, 
unpreparedness, delay, inaction, and environmental injustice. The 
[MDEQ] failed in its fundamental responsibility to effectively enforce 
drinking water regulations. The Michigan Department of Health and 
Human Services failed to adequately and promptly act to protect public 
health. Both agencies, but principally the MDEQ, stubbornly worked to 
discredit and dismiss others’ attempts to bring the issues of unsafe water, 
lead contamination, and increased cases of [Legionnaires’ disease] to light. 
With the City of Flint under emergency management, the Flint Water 
Department rushed unprepared into full-time operation of the Flint Water 
Treatment Plant, drawing water from a highly corrosive source without the 
use of corrosion control. Though MDEQ was delegated primacy . . . the 
[EPA] delayed enforcement of the [SDWA] and Lead and Copper Rule, 
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office took steps to reverse poor decisions by MDEQ and state-appointed 
emergency managers until October 2015 . . . . The significant 
consequences of these failures for Flint will be long-lasting. They have 
deeply affected Flint’s public health, its economic future, and residents’ 
trust in government.145 
 
Ultimately, it was not the acts of one individual or agency that caused the disaster in 
Flint, but a compounding series of failures. 
The Flint water crisis has resulted in a great deal of litigation, which continues 
to burden the courts today. The number of persons who have been exposed to Flint 
water is in the tens of thousands.146 Perhaps the most troubling fact is that the current 
legislation in place should have prevented this from happening—specifically, the 
LCR mandates the use of an anti-corrosive agent for suspect waters like those from 
the Flint River, regular monitoring of that water system, and immediate public 
notification if excess levels of pollutants are found during water sampling. A 
comprehensive study of these events in Flint should provide a platform for education 
and allow for the expansion of legislation to fill regulatory gaps. 
 
B.  The Exception for Oil and Gas Operations 
 
The process known as hydraulic fracturing (fracking) began in the early 1940s 
to continue stimulating production from oil reservoirs.147 With technological 
advances, including the use of horizontal drilling, fracking is being used to extract 
oil and gas in low-permeability formations including coal beds, tight gas sands, and 
unconventional shale formations.148 The process of fracking has allowed for the 
development of domestic tight oil resources, reducing dependence on international 
resources.149 There are nearly 1.3 million oil and gas facilities150 in operation within 
the U.S. today. While this method of oil and gas extraction has vastly expanded 
domestic production, it also presents an array of concerns, including trespass on 
private lands, the triggering of localized earthquakes, and environmental 
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contamination. In particular, there is growing apprehension regarding the 
contamination of groundwater by fracking. 
Because of the low permeable nature of the formations being targeted, the basic 
idea of fracking is to create fractures within the formation, providing space through 
which the natural gas or oil can easily flow to the surface.151 The process starts by 
drilling a well and inserting a steel pipe casing into the well bore.152 The casing is 
perforated along the targeted zones, allowing the fracturing fluid to flow into the 
target zones when injected.153 Once the formation is saturated and cannot absorb any 
more, the pressure resulting from the fluids still being injected will cause the 
formation to fracture.154 Fracking fluids will include some sort of proppant, a “solid 
material . . . used to hold open the cracks made in the reservoir rock after the high 
pressure of the fracturing fluids is reduced [including] sand, ceramic beads, or 
miniature pellets.”155 Proppants remain within the formation to keep the fractures 
open.156 
In addition to the proppants, fracking fluids include a large volume of water 
and chemical additives.157 Additives will often consist of gels that carry the proppant 
into the fractures, biocides to limit bacterial growth, inhibitors against pipe 
corrosion, and sometimes acid in order to dissolve rock material to enable easier gas 
and fluid flows.158 The exact mixtures of fracking fluids vary widely, depending on 
the well. Some percentage of the fracking fluid will return to the surface, called 
flowback,159 while some may remain underground. Studies have shown that in some 
cases, over 90% of the fluids remain underground.160 
These fluids pose a significant risk to drinking water supply. Underground 
contaminants, namely methane, can reach drinking water through the fractured rock, 
as well as via abandoned wells.161 Contaminants can also reach water supplies 
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through poorly cemented or completely un-cemented fracking wells.162 The EPA 
analyzed a representative sample of oil and gas wells throughout the U.S., 
discovering that 66% of wells had one or more un-cemented regions and that “3% 
of wells had un-cemented regions within the depth where well operators reported 
there was groundwater—putting them at high risk of contaminating drinking 
water.”163 
Groundwater can also be contaminated by chemicals being directly injected 
into underground sources of drinking water (USDWs).164 In 2004, the EPA released 
a final study evaluating the impacts to USDWs by fracking in coalbed methane 
reservoirs.165 The report found that approximately 90% of coalbed methane basins 
in the country are at least partially located in USDWs.166 There are also reported 
cases in which fracking fluids are injected directly into USDWs during normal 
operations.167 A handful of fracking chemicals, including benzene and methanol, 
may be injected into or close to USDWs in concentrations that threaten human 
health.168 The concentration of these chemicals can be anywhere from four to nearly 
thirteen thousand times the acceptable concentration in drinking water.169 
Furthermore, the exact mixture of the chemicals is generally unknown. Public 
records contain information about the most likely chemicals to be used, but beyond 
that it is only speculation unless a state’s statute specifically requires that the exact 
mixture be released to the public.170  
The contamination of drinking water can be extremely hazardous. Health 
problems to humans include increased fatigue, nausea, joint pain, and irritation of 
the eyes, nose, throat, and skin.171 The overall quality of the water can decrease as 
well. Increased levels of methane can cause frothing and bubbles in the water.172 In 
some communities near fracking wells, residents can light their tap water on fire due 
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to the increased levels of methane.173 Residents in the Black Warrior Basin of 
Alabama claimed that their tap water had a milky white substance and strong odors 
after fracking, while other residents found globs of black jelly-like grease that had a 
petroleum smell.174 In the San Juan Basin located in Colorado and New Mexico, a 
county employee found “explosive levels of methane” and “toxic levels of hydrogen 
sulfide” in residents’ homes.175 Fracking fluids have also been correlated with the 
death of plant and animal life.176  
In light of these concerns with the contamination of drinking water supplies, it 
would seem appropriate that fracking and the fluids therefrom be regulated under 
the SDWA. However, that is not the case. The legal battle began when the Legal 
Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc. (LEAF) filed a petition with the EPA in 
1997, asking for the rescission of the EPA’s approval of an Alabama UIC program, 
which had been involved with unregulated methane gas fracking activities on eight 
separate occasions.177 LEAF alleged that the regulation of state UIC programs under 
the SDWA applied in this case, requiring Alabama to first obtain an authorized 
permit before approving the operations.178 The EPA denied the petition, claiming 
that fracking didn’t fall within the regulatory definition of “underground injection” 
because the principal function of the fracking wells was not underground fluid 
displacement.179 In response, LEAF contended that the narrow interpretation was 
inconsistent with the SDWA regulations, and that fracking clearly had to be 
regulated under state UIC programs due to the statutory definition of “underground 
injections.”180 The court agreed with LEAF, finding that Congress had dictated that 
all underground injection programs be regulated181 in order to achieve the purpose 
of “prevent[ting] underground injection which endangers drinking water sources.”182 
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Before the court could act to enforce its holding, Alabama revised its UIC 
program.183 This gave the EPA the ability to approve the revised program under the 
less restrictive § 1425 of the SDWA184 and effectively classify fracking activities as 
separate from UIC regulation. LEAF challenged the EPA’s actions again, and the 
Eleventh Circuit again ruled in favor of LEAF, holding that the “EPA must classify 
hydraulic fracturing into one of the five specific SDWA categories for the clear 
purpose of underground injection regulation.”185 This success was short-lived, as the 
EPA and the oil and gas industry continued to search for ways around fracking 
regulation. 
In 2003, the EPA entered an agreement with three major oil and gas companies 
that controlled 95% of the fracking industry, asking them to remove diesel fuel and 
“other toxic substances” from the fluids being injected underground.186 The 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) established a voluntary arrangement between 
the EPA and three major oil companies, wherein all agreeing companies had thirty 
days from signing to terminate their use of diesel fuel in fracking processes.187  
The MOA did not have the kind of regulatory authority as was originally hoped 
for, and Congress officially exempted fracking from the SDWA two years later.188 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 amended §1421(d) of the SDWA, formally 
excluding fracking from the statutory definition of underground injection.189 While 
the EPA has established minimum standards that the state UIC programs must meet, 
the risks that fracking poses to drinking water supplies are significant enough that 
the fracking process should be regulated under federal law. 
 
V.  ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENTS 
 
A.  Infrastructure and Regulation Updates 
 
The passing of the WIIN Act was a critical step in addressing the infrastructure 
deficiencies of the nation, by providing grants to help update and replace aging 
systems. However, the need for reform is much larger than replacing aged 
infrastructure in a mere handful of impoverished communities. According to the 
American Water Works Association, “an estimated $1 trillion is necessary to 
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maintain and expand service to meet [drinking water] demands over the next 25 
years.”190  
There is a total of one million miles of pipes across the country that deliver 
drinking water, many of which were installed before the middle of the 20th century 
with an approximate lifespan of 75–100 years.191 At the current rate that utilities are 
replacing water pipes, it will take an estimated 200 years to replace the entire 
system.192 As the pipes continue to age, there is an increased risk of corrosion, 
rusting, and breaking.  
One of the most concerning realities of aging pipes is the risk of water 
contamination. Flint is certainly not the only U.S. city to experience contaminated 
drinking water due to aged pipes. In 2015, an estimated eighteen million people were 
served by PWSs that were in violation of the LCR.193 Offenses included failures to 
report contamination to state officials and the public as well as failures to test the 
water for lead or conditions that would result in lead contamination.194 In a study of 
approximately 1,100 community water systems serving 3.9 million people, at least 
10% of the homes tested showed lead levels over 15 ppb.195 
Despite the hard evidence that demonstrates the widespread contamination 
risks to drinking water, the EPA’s record for taking formal enforcement action 
against violators has been scarce. According to their own data analyzing the reported 
violations in 2015, the EPA only took formal action against 11.2% of infractions.196 
This lack of accountability sends a message to service providers that compliance is 
more of a suggestion rather than mandatory action. In order to prevent another 
disaster like Flint, it is essential that the EPA and state agencies take action against 
violators. 
The enforcement of present regulation is fundamental to ensuring widespread 
access to clean drinking water, as is updating the regulation that must be enforced. 
In light of the Flint crisis, the EPA recognized that there was a compelling need to 
revise the LCR in order to “strengthen its public health protections and to clarify its 
implementation requirements to make it more effective and more readily 
enforceable.”197 To be able to meet these objectives, the EPA is currently evaluating 
recommendations from the National Drinking Water Advisory Council (NDWAC) 
and other stakeholders on possible revisions to the LCR.198 Some of the principal 
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recommendations that should be adopted to protect human health include the 
implementation of a national lead service line replacement program, updated 
corrosion control treatment requirements, and increasing transparency and 
information shared with the public.199 
The SDWA and the subsequent LCR have made significant progress in 
monitoring and reducing the presence of lead and copper in drinking water supplies, 
and in mandating the shift in materials used for new infrastructure and repairs. The 
EPA should seriously take into consideration the NDWAC’s recommendations and 
continue to revise these regulations in order to reduce exposure to hazardous 
substances through outdated infrastructure.  
 
B.  Uniform Regulation for Oil & Gas Industry 
 
Because fracking injects contaminants underground, sometimes directly into 
groundwater sources, it should not be exempt from regulation under the SDWA. 
While some states have individually implemented their own regulations regarding 
fracking and its byproducts,200 they offer varying levels of protection without 
uniformity. Underground water is not stagnant and the migration across state borders 
is difficult to predict. Furthermore, fracking fluids left in a formation or 
contaminates underground drinking water may remain there for decades, posing 
risks for future generations. 
The very purpose of the SDWA was to establish uniform standards for drinking 
water in order to ensure the health of the nation.201 In particular, the UIC program 
was created to protect underground sources of drinking water.202 Underground 
injection is defined as “the subsurface emplacement of fluids by well injection,” 
excluding the underground storage of natural gas, and since the amendment in 2005, 
fracking fluids.203 In further explaining the purpose of the UIC program mandate, 
the SDWA specifically states that “[u]nderground injection endangers drinking 
water sources if such injection may result in the presence in underground water 
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which supplies or can reasonably be expected to supply any public water system of 
any contaminant . . . [that] may otherwise adversely affect the health of persons.”204  
The exemption of fracking fluids from regulation under the UIC program is 
erroneous. The fracking process falls neatly within the definition of ‘underground 
injection,’ as one of the key steps to the process is the injection of the fluids 
underground.205 Further, while the exact composition of the fracking fluid mixture 
is generally unknown, the studies that have been conducted show that the fracking 
fluids adversely affect human health.206 Exempting fracking from regulation under 
the UIC program of the SDWA provides no benefit to the public—rather, the only 
benefit provided is to the oil and gas operators who are left with one less federal 
regulation to comply with during the course of their operations. The SDWA was 
enacted to provide safe drinking water at the tap. Providing a benefit to industry by 
exempting fracking from regulation does not fall neatly within the purpose of the 
SDWA, and accordingly, the exemption should be repealed.  
Additionally, elements of fracking fluids that pose a serious risk to public health 
should be reconsidered. The SDWA still regulates diesel fuel in underground 
injection processes, but diesel fuel is only one of many potentially hazardous 
ingredients used. The risk of groundwater contamination from fracking fluids is 
significant enough that the EPA needs to either strictly regulate their use or 
implement an outright ban. 
 
C.  Increase the Number of Regulated Chemicals 
 
Since the 1990s, the EPA has come close to successfully regulating only one 
new contaminant.207 In 2011, the EPA announced its intention to set a federal 
standard for perchlorate, a chemical found in rocket fuel and road flares known to 
disrupt thyroid functions in humans.208 But since then, no federal action has actually 
been taken. It is imperative that more regulations be established, especially 
considering that tens of thousands of new chemicals have come into use since the 
SDWA’s first inception.209  
The slowing of the pace in regulating new chemicals is, in part, due to the 
standards established in 1996. In refining the ‘regulatory treadmill,’ the new 
guidelines resulted in the EPA having to move more deliberately in passing new 
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regulations by having to “prove that there is a meaningful opportunity to improve 
public health.”210 While there are obvious benefits to this approach of ensuring 
sound science, those benefits are practically obsolete if no new regulations are being 
enacted. The whole idea behind the SDWA was that it would be updated regularly 
as more information came to light regarding contaminants. 
Despite the challenge of having to navigate through these administrative hoops, 
it is still no excuse for why some contaminants have not yet been listed. For a 
chemical like perchlorate, there is ample evidence proving that it should be regulated 
under the SDWA. Even trace amounts can be dangerous to human health, as it 
prevents the thyroid from absorbing iodine, required to produce hormones critical 
for brain development.211 California took action to regulate perchlorate in their 
drinking water by setting a limit of 6 ppb, a concentration approximately equating 
to mixing three teaspoons into an Olympic-sized swimming pool.212 Massachusetts 
has set an even stricter standard of 2 ppb.213 However, the EPA has still not taken 
action at a national level, despite having found the chemical in the drinking water of 
forty-five states, as well as in the bodies of every single American who has been 
tested for it.214 After the National Resources Defense Council filed a lawsuit in 2016 
demanding results, the EPA signed a consent decree agreeing to finalize regulation 
for perchlorate by the end of 2019.215 Until that regulation is adopted, perchlorate 
remains unregulated at the federal level. 
In order to address this major failure of the SDWA, it is essential to revisit the 
procedural requirements currently in place. House Democrats have introduced a bill 
that would do just that. The bill proposes to remove some of the procedural 
requirements and mandates that the EPA set standards for a minimum of ten new 
contaminants every three years, along with another measure to increase federal 
funding.216 While the listing of new contaminants should continue to be based on 
sound science, there must be a streamlined process to enable regulators to update the 
list of contaminants accordingly. With updates to industrial and technological 
processes nationwide, threats to the public health do not remain static year after year. 
Accordingly, the regulations implemented to protect public health should not remain 
static either. Furthermore, previous amendments to the SDWA mandated that the 
list of regulated chemicals be routinely updated on a rolling basis, supporting the 
idea that Congress intended these regulations to be systematically revised. The 
mandate to periodically revisit the list of regulated chemicals should again be 
implemented to ensure the safety of the nation’s drinking waters. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
The SDWA was a major regulatory step in protecting the nation’s drinking 
water and the public’s health. Creating a uniform set of regulations for levels of 
viruses, bacteria, and chemicals ensured cleaner water for all citizens and ultimately 
has allowed the United States to provide some of the cleanest water worldwide. The 
revisions made in 1986, 1996, and 2016 have continued to expand the SDWA by 
listing more contaminants for regulation as well as providing more federal funding 
to assist water providers in meeting these objectives. 
While there is no doubt that the SDWA has a host of successes, there is still 
room to improve. The recent water crisis in Flint brought light to this fact, 
uncovering a pattern of intransigence, unpreparedness, environmental injustice, and 
ultimately, the government’s own unwillingness to take immediate action. There is 
a need for more regulation to reduce lead levels in drinking water, including both 
infrastructure updates and stricter enforcement against systems who are in breach. 
Because of our aging infrastructure nationwide, it is necessary to acquire additional 
funding to support these updates. 
Furthermore, hydraulic fracturing needs to be regulated at a national level. The 
threats that fracking poses both in the certainty that it can affect underground sources 
of drinking water and the adverse effects to public health make it critical that 
fracking be regulated under the SDWA. Fracking should be maintained once again 
under the UIC provisions, and fracking fluid chemicals posing a serious risk to 
human health need to be monitored, and in some cases, entirely banned. 
Additionally, the SDWA needs to be consistently updated with more contaminants 
that pose a health risk. 
While the SDWA has transformed over the course of forty-five years into a 
crucial regulatory tool for the nation’s drinking water supplies, it is essential that it 
continue to be revised in order to meet the goal of providing clean and safe drinking 
water to consumers. 
